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Economic problems have marked the recent history of eastern Ukraine. 
The region entered a phase of prolonged economic depression and 
structural problems in the early 1990s and was only just starting 
to recover from the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis when the 
armed conflict broke out in Spring 2014. The armed conflict further 
exacerbated an already difficult situation: large-scale destruction, 
disposal of industrial assets, physical and economic disconnection 
from Ukraine, and massive loss of productive population compounded 
many other challenges for the regional economy. 
While diplomatic efforts towards a political resolution of the conflict 
progress slowly and contradictorily, it is high time to start a structured 
reflection on the post-conflict recovery of the region.  Peace in Donbas 
appears distant at the moment, but economic incentives could play a 
useful role in addressing the diverging interests of conflicting parties. 
A common understanding on the future economic model for Donbas 
could help overcome the current deadlock. 
The first meeting of the High-Level Policy Dialogue (HLPD), 
organised by the School of Transnational Governance of the European 
University Institute on 15 December 2018, brought together high 
level policy influencers, leading economists, academics and civil 
society representatives working on the region. The HLPD analysed 
current economic dynamics in the Donbas and possible measures 
which could facilitate exiting the negative scenario.  The discussion 
focused both on the transformations taking place in Ukraine and on 
the contours of the "end game" defined in the Minsk agreements.
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1. The conflict in eastern Ukraine: political 
and economic realities
The Donbas was one of the most important industrial 
and coal producing regions of the Russian Empire and 
the USSR. Its economic downturn started in 1991, with 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the transition of 
post-Soviet states to a free market system. In the first two 
decades following Ukraine’s independence the decline 
continued unabated, but the Donbas remained an impor-
tant industrial engine for the Ukrainian economy, with 
steel and heavy metal industry playing a central role. 
Although yearly coal production was still 83.7 million 
tons in 2013, making it the third biggest coal producer 
in Europe after Poland and Russia, the number of func-
tioning coal mines in the region had dropped from 250 
in the mid-1990s to 100. At the same time, widespread 
cross-subsidisation of the region’s industries discouraged 
economic diversification. 
The deterioration of the global economy in the aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crisis, coupled with an increasing 
fall of Russian imports of Ukrainian products, plunged 
Donbas into deep economic recession. Both the Donetsk’s 
and Luhansk’s export-oriented economies suffered from 
the heavy contraction of trade in engineering, agricul-
tural and food products. By 2013 the region had returned 
to grow but the beginning of the armed conflict in Spring 
2014 impacted it in a heavy manner. Gross regional 
products fell by 60%, with about 50% and 75% reduc-
tion in industrial productions and commodity export 
respectively. This contraction represented a large share 
of Ukraine’s total GDP loss in those years (about 15% at 
country level) and resulted in inflation and large increase 
in foreign and domestic debt. 
1. After five years of destruction and isolation, Donbas presents a highly degraded economic situation. 
While the region had already experienced serious socio-economic problems before 2014, the impact of 
the conflict on the industrial base and on the human and social capital has been devastating. There is no 
way to return to the pre-war situation. 
2. While current prospects for immediate reintegration remain dim, any effort to reintegrate non-
government controlled territories (NGCT) and goverment-controlled territories (GCT) must avoid 
creating further dividing lines, and must provide peace dividends for the entire population. The success 
of future reintegration is also dependent on setting up an economic alternative which is attractive to 
the whole region, including the populations in the occupied territories, and to the rest of Ukraine. The 
financial participation of external players in providing, at least in part, peace dividends to all is essential. 
3. The GCT, and in the future a reintegrated Donbas, needs a long-term development plan that also 
accounts for the costs of reintegration. It should build on Ukraine’s successful decentralisation process 
and on previous positive experiences. It could include, by way of example, special economic zones, areas 
of diversification of the production base and investment in social capital.
4. To operationalise the new development model for the region, a possible plan for reconnecting the 
two parts of the region should be drawn, including through rehabilitating the industrial base, while 
at the same time ensuring that it moves up in the value chain, and through increasing connectivity 
at the national and international level. International funding and public-private partnerships could 
be mobilised to develop the existing potential in agribusiness, light engineering and ICT.  Small 
and medium enterprises' (SMEs) support, mechanisms for injecting microfinance, and attention to 
governance at the local level should be pursued.
5. Any economic solution should always be seen in the broader framework of conflict resolution.
Key take-away points from the HLPD
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The Ukrainian economy has since partially recovered 
and is currently undergoing a cycle of modest positive 
growth. Capital investment by Ukrainian companies has 
been a main driver of growth and exports, but key mac-
roeconomic imbalances remain, particularly in terms of 
shortage of capital, excessive pressure on trade balance 
and labour migration. 
1.1 Donbas' economic situation and prospects for 
the government-controlled and non-government 
controlled territories
The demographic situation of the Donbas region is tragic. 
Only 10% of the population is below 20, and 37% below 
40.  The birth rate is 5.1 per 1000 people and the mortality 
rate is one of the highest in the world. As the conflict con-
tinues, the aging population is likely to increase with a 
considerable drop in the number of economically active 
people. 
As mentioned, before the conflict the industrial produc-
tion downturn had heavily impacted the economies of 
the controlled (GCT) and non-government controlled 
areas (NGCT) of the Donbas. The crisis that followed was 
also a result of lack of economic diversification. The huge 
economic downturn since the start of the conflict reflects 
the economic specificities of the two parts of the region. 
1.1.1 Government-controlled territories (GCT)
The conflict significantly worsened the situation. The 
region lost competitiveness and economic ties and 
the industrial potential of the area was considerably 
reduced, particularly for coal, mining and metallurgy. 
In the Luhansk region, where agriculture is important, 
the destruction of connectivity between the two parts of 
the Donbas region, particularly after 2017, resulted in a 
considerable and rapid decrease in trade and commercial 
transit, despite the continuing increase in the number of 
individuals crossing the contact line (+20% in 2018).
More specifically the economy of the newly formed 
region is characterised by:
• a reduction in diversity of the industrial base com-
pared to pre-conflict, which comprises essentially the 
metallurgical, chemical and coal industries;
• obstacles to the normal operations of the industrial 
facilities located near the line of demarcation;
• a loss of exports and changes in exports’ geographical 
structure. Since 2013, the share of Donbas’ exports 
(non-government-controlled part excluded) to the 
country’s overall exports has decreased by 2.5 times. 
Raw materials and semi-manufactured products 
dominate the region’s export;
• an increase in the relative weight of the agricultural 
sector, particularly for the Luhansk region;
• drop in the internal resource base, e.g. lack of coking 
coal, as it can be found mainly in the non-govern-
ment controlled part of the region;
• the destruction of the region’s connectivity, including 
the prospects for transport corridors along the Black 
and Azov Seas.
1.1.2 Non-Government-controlled territories (NGCT)
The region’s industry is especially concentrated in coal 
mining and the metallurgic sectors, (heavily concentrated 
sectors themselves): two large companies represent 60% of 
the NGCT industrial capacity, and coal mining accounts 
for 60% of the activities. Despite its physical assets, the 
NGCT economy faces a severe industrial recession. From 
2013 to 2017, the metallurgical sector decreased almost 
four-fold, production capacities decreased five-fold, and 
their share in the area’s total turnover shrank by 2.5 times. 
The conflict has brought about physical destruction, out-
flow of capital, and loss of commercial and industrial con-
nections and businesses. The degradation of economic 
and social capital in the NGCT has left an aging popula-
tion and a devastated industrial base. The economic base 
is outdated, markets have disappeared and during the 
active phase of the armed conflict (2014-2016) many cap-
ital goods have been uninstalled and shipped to Russia or 
sold as scrap metal. Investments are at a historical low.
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In a nutshell, several factors explain the severity of the 
recession:
• the unrecognised status of breakaway territories, 
which provides abundant opportunities for economic 
actors to work in the shadows1;
• the physical destruction or pillage of industrial 
assets;
• a huge outflow of capital at the initial stage of the 
conflict;
• the disruption of industrial ties;
• the need to replace traditional raw materials and 
energy sources from Ukraine, and attempts at organ-
ising new supply chains connected to Russia.  Com-
peting industries, based on the same raw materials, 
can be found in the Russian part of the Donbas, just 
across the border with NGCT;
• the loss of markets and a re-focus of the engineering 
sector on the repair of military equipment;
• the near-to-complete destruction of machine-
building enterprises dependent on the Ukrainian 
market; 
• increasing unemployment, the reduction and nat-
uralisation of wages, and the destruction of human 
capital.
In addition, the establishment of new production ties 
with Russia was carried out on the condition that NGCT 
economic assets be put under the control of Russia-based 
businesses. The functioning of the export sector (the 
coal and metallurgical sectors) of the NGCTs is critically 
dependent on the capacity of NGCT-based companies to 
legalise their sales to Russia (sometimes followed by their 
illegal re-export to Ukraine or other countries).  
Finally, organised crime groups have been a deterrent to 
foreign investment in NGCT, including Russian invest-
ment. While population emigration remains the main 
problem, the question of weak rule of law is central to the 
sustainability of the economy.
In sum, the region has lost its economic self-sufficiency, 
is burdened with technically obsolete enterprises, and is 
fragmented and structurally unbalanced. The prospects 
for self-sustained recovery and development are seriously 
undermined.
2. What prospects for reintegration?
Against this backdrop, the reintegration of Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions will necessarily be difficult and poten-
tially problematic for the weakened Ukrainian economy 
and public finances. There is widespread recognition 
that reconstruction while military activity is still taking 
place, is problematic. The human factor is essential to 
exiting the crisis. An estimated 1.5 million people have 
left the occupied territories, while the bulk of residents 
are pensioners. As shown by the IOM National Moni-
toring System in Ukraine the number of people intending 
to go back to the Donbas region is falling each quarter2. 
While many parts of the region are underpopulated, the 
UN states that 40,000 houses were damaged during the 
conflict. Nearly 700 schools and many roads and bridges 
need to be rehabilitated or rebuilt. Many territories have 
mine fields, and de-mining is estimated to require up to 
15 years. Furthermore, the environment suffers serious 
problems, including flooding of coal mines, water, land 
and air contamination by military activity and 150,000 
hectares of forest have been impacted. The cost of 
addressing these issues will put a huge burden on the 
country’s public finance; this requires a careful and timely 
assessment and a strategic approach that are still lacking.
Finally, the economic reintegration of the non-gov-
ernment-controlled areas into the Ukrainian economy 
appears increasingly challenging. The region is attempting 
to develop economic connections with Russia to the det-
riment of its links with Ukraine, but the Russian Federa-
tion shows little interest. The persistence of the conflict 
continues to exacerbate the problems highlighted above.
At the same time, the reintegration of post-conflict 
Donetsk and Luhansk could also present some oppor-
tunities. For instance, because of the necessity to rebuild 
the economy from scratch, these regions could be more 
receptive to enacting structural reforms, thus increasing 
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their potential in terms of attractiveness for investors. As 
other parts of Ukraine, there will also be a need to re-
orient exports.
At the sub-regional level, the Donbas is quite diversified: 
some areas are industrialised and urbanised while others 
are preponderantly agricultural; some territories remain 
economically active, but others are totally depressed. 
As a consequence, the response measures are neces-
sarily different. For instance, depressed areas require 
strong revitalisation efforts as well as the launching of 
self-employment facilities and schemes to attract invest-
ments. Ukraine has been rather successful in reforming 
local communities during the first phase of its decen-
tralisation reform; a similar process could also be used 
to support local communities in the Donbas as well as 
their efforts to reload social capital. By doing so, attention 
would shift away from conflict dynamics to the develop-
ment and organisation of local communities, territories 
and utilities. Central European experiences, where hun-
dreds of heavy industry workers were reoriented to jobs 
in different sectors, could serve as a useful example for 
restructuring the region. 
3. The economic dimension of conflict 
resolution
The economic dimension represents a crucial yet often 
overlooked dimension of conflict resolution in eastern 
Ukraine. For example, economic recovery, and its dem-
onstrated positive effects, are essential elements to ending 
the conflict, while addressing the ecological dimension 
could provide incentives to tackle some underlying ques-
tions of the conflict when the conditions are ripe. 
Huge economic benefits both in terms of growth and 
security could be delivered to the citizens if a peaceful 
solution is brought to Donbas. Creating a link between 
conflict resolution in the Donbas and Ukrainian eco-
nomic development would ensure that the entire country 
buys into the peace-building project. 
In this context, sequencing is important. The first pri-
ority should be to start reflecting on what can be done 
to redevelop large parts of GCT and re-connect them 
with Ukraine’s domestic, as well as with Europe and the 
Black Sea, markets.  However, setting up an economically 
attractive alternative also for the population in the occu-
pied territories is crucial for reintegration. 
With the trade ban and expropriation decisions of March 
2017, separation between the two territories, both in 
economic and in structural terms, has entered a deeper 
phase and most of the economic links have been severed. 
It is therefore important that the government and the 
international community come up with a clear plan for 
reintegration of the government-controlled and the non-
government controlled parts of the region with the rest of 
Ukraine. To avoid creating further dividing lines, peace 
dividends should be made available for the whole popu-
lation, different constituencies and stakeholders. The role 
of the EU and the international donor community in 
supporting this process is essential; this point needs to be 
considered in more detail.
The case for reintegration and the improvements on 
quality of life and living standards should be made com-
pelling and communicated to both sides. One of the 
challenges is to win back the trust and confidence of the 
Ukrainians on the non-government controlled side. 1.2 
million citizens move across contact line every month and 
efforts should be made to create a narrative supporting 
reintegration as an enabler of a better economic future for 
all. Direct communication – at the crossing points and 
through the media – could provide an excellent opportu-
nity to win hearts and minds. Should economic changes 
in GCT be successful, they could serve as a positive 
model of what the future could look like in terms of jobs, 
salaries, education, healthcare, social payments, and pen-
sions if the NGCT embark on the reintegration pathway. 
A successful economic model could thus help in creating 
a conducive environment for the peace process.
4. Designing Donbas' economic model for 
reintegration: possible approaches and 
practices
What could be retained of the current Donbas’ economic 
model? What are the prospects for diversification? Which 
sectors should be targeted? What kind of policies should 
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be used? To what extent does the future of region depend 
on re-establishing financial relations with Russia? Sev-
eral questions concerning the future economic model for 
the post-conflict Donbas were raised during the HLPD, 
including on the investment needs for the wider region 
and on the role of the international community. 
The participants of the HLPD were more optimistic 
about the GCTs. Considering also the Minsk agreements, 
decentralisation appears as an excellent template for posi-
tive transformation in Ukraine and NGCTs in the future. 
Free economic zones were considered as one possible 
model for the territory along the contact line. However, 
to set up special economic zones, labour force would be 
needed, and the question of how to motivate return to the 
region is central. 
More generally, investment in social and human capital, 
moving people into new sectors of the economy as well 
as rebooting human capital through the improvement of 
existing industrial capacities are essential. These processes 
can be facilitated by optimising the existing commercial 
and industrial connections as well and by increasing 
competitiveness through innovation and reintegration.
As a region, today’s Donbas is clearly marginalised and 
needs to be reconnected to make industrial policy and 
economic free zones attractive to investors. Enhancing 
connectivity must also permit access to Turkey and other 
markets across the Black Sea. In this context, the current 
security issues in the Azov Sea are worrisome. Main-
taining access to deep water ports in the Black Sea is cru-
cial for Ukraine’s survival as an export country.  It is of 
paramount importance to avoid a further deterioration 
of the situation, which would impede access to the Black 
Sea. 
The effective elements of the existing industrial base 
should be preserved and can constitute a springboard for 
the future. To be effective, though, it needs access to both 
the domestic and the international markets. Infrastruc-
ture investment is necessary to make economic connec-
tivity possible (estimated within 2 to 5 year period). In 
particular, it should focus on the following areas
• Transport logistics, connecting the East with the rest 
of the country. Currently there is no air connection, 
and the road connections are poor. While there has 
been an explosion in air travel in Ukraine, in the East 
there is still no good airport. Building a regional air-
port, and improving transport links, will be crucial to 
the connectivity of the region.
• Improving rail connectivity between the East and 
the centre. In light of the threat in the Azov Sea, 
improving the rail link from Mariupol is essential to 
provide alternatives for travel in and out the region. 
Rail and port investment are crucial to connectivity, 
both for agribusiness and for metallurgy. 
• Improving regional ports capacity and increase the 
maritime traffic through those.
These connectivity measures would permit that Ukrainian 
producers move away from commoditised products and 
move up the value chain for exports. This would benefit 
the country, through the development of knowledge and 
human capital, higher valued products, and better sala-
ries. 
The east of Ukraine needs to be integrated into the 
EU supply chain, following the example of the rest of 
the Ukrainian economy. Essential EU manufacturing 
depends on steel from Ukraine and some 40% of steel 
from Mariupol is shipped to the EU. Greater focus on 
clarifying the role of the Donbas in international supply 
chains could better support its industrial recovery. 
In terms of investments, it has become very difficult to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI), as the region 
is considered too distant because of the lack of good 
transport connections and too risky due to the conflict. 
Most of the capital which could be attracted is likely to 
be domestic, focusing on the opportunities provided by 
improving the existing manufacturing and industrial 
base. In this context, a newly created Donbas economic 
development agency could work with the government to 
develop a master plan for the development of the region. 
The agency should be coupled with a regional develop-
ment bank for Donbas, funded by a combination of inter-
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national donors, the Ukrainian government and regional 
government, but also other partners, if assurances were 
provided on the independence of the management board. 
With a clear governance model, property rights and 
respect for the rule of law, banks would be able to provide 
relatively low-cost loans within the Donbas. 
The biggest challenge in the Donbas today is access 
to capital. It is important to find successful businesses 
that can grow quickly, and leverage private investment 
through public investment and solid banking. A broadly-
based regional development bank would be more likely to 
be successful and bring in the capital necessary. 
In addition to the EU, other actors could also participate, 
including for instance the US, Canada, Japan, China and 
of course Ukraine. Russia should also be invited to con-
tribute, as part of the reset of bilateral relations. While 
competing global priorities limit the current interna-
tional appetite to invest in the region’s re-development, 
the recovery of the Donbas cannot be achieved by the 
government of Ukraine alone. The case for investment 
in the Donbas must be made both domestically, in rela-
tion to the benefits to the society and the economy, 
and explained internationally as a cost-effective way of 
ensuring security and safety of the Donbas and its rein-
tegration. 
There was consensus that the future of the region would 
lie in particular in the development of small and medium 
enterprise (SMEs) and shifting to an SME-driven 
economy as opposed to large corporations. Government 
and private policy should focus on SMEs as potential eco-
nomic actors and as a way to accelerate economic growth 
and employment opportunities in the region. Being less 
capital intensive, and able to act faster, SMEs would be 
central to the future economic recovery of the Donbas. 
Finally, there is no question that the primary driver of 
redevelopment will be people. They need to be reinte-
grated first and a primary goal needs to be the creation of 
job opportunities, which may also include self-employ-
ment. A job-creation scheme will also allow ex-combat-
ants and all those recruited into illegal armed formations 
to be given alternatives, and prevent the risk of returning 
to such activities. Allowing ex-combatants, after careful 
vetting, to become a constructive part of the social fabric 
that needs to be rebuilt in the region is key to its future; it 
will require careful consideration and communication of 
the rules on amnesty. Some thoughts will need to be given 
to how to find opportunities for those people and how to 
engage them in community building, in rebuilding trust 
within communities, as well as in broader questions of 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) 
as well as in dealing with Post-Traumatic Stress Dis-
order. De-mining was put forward as one possible area 
of activity.
5. Next steps
The participants of the HLPD agreed that the outcome of 
the discussion held at EUI on 15 December 2018 should 
be shared externally. There was also a consensus that the 
next step should be to involve both donors and political 
actors inside Ukraine. In particular, efforts will be made 
to reach out to those responsible for planning policies 
and operationalise the plans for economic development. 
It was agreed among participants that the next dialogue 
would bring in relevant donors and international actors. 
This could include the donor community, the banking 
community, and possibly other actors from the private 
sector. Broadening the participants would allow space for 
further debate, and possibly implementing some of the 
ideas. Further, there was agreement that the proposals 
emerging from the dialogue should be brought to the 
attention not only of the business community but also 
politicians, including the newly elected government after 
the snap parliamentary elections in July 2019. In this con-
text, the media could at some point in the future be used 
to promote the result of the dialogue and share it with the 
political powers in Ukraine. 
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Endnotes
1 Since the introduction of a trade ban by the Ukrain-
ian authorities in March 2017 (in response to the expropria-
tion of Ukrainian assets in NGCT), all enterprises in NGCT 
are excluded from accessing Ukraine, for most previously the 
largest market.
2 See Ukraine — National Monitoring System: The 
Situation of IDPs (March 2018), available at https://displace-
ment.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/nms_round_9_eng_press_0.
pdf?file=1&type=node&id=4962
Sectors and policies identified as having the 
greatest potential
1. Agricultural business, as a possible future 
engine for growth – before the conflict this was 
the third largest sector and the potential for 
growth still remains;
2. Light engineering – as heavy engineering, 
whose the main customer base was Russia, 
has declined, the skillsets could be easily 
redeployed to the light engineering sector;
3. ICT – Donetsk has a flourishing interest 
in ICT, which would provide an excellent 
opportunity to capture young human capacity;
4. Microloans and finance. Microfinance 
institutions could help build microbusinesses, 
also through existing skills, mentoring and 
assistance by IDPs. 
5. SME support in several sectors.
Suggested steps for the recovery of the Donbas 
region
1. Total reassessment of potential of regional 
development, and the main goals and priorities 
for development in the region.
2. New life for old industries, by finding ways to 
make them more competitive.
3. New logistics – the logistics of the region 
should be strategically rebuilt considering new 
boundaries.
4. Reloading social capital.
5. Transparent financial instruments.
6. Modern organisational forms, which can be 
tested in territory of regions, communication 
between companies.
7. Pilot projects based on specific sectors, in 
coordination with other regions.
8. Attention to environmental issues, including 
through independent studies and a robust 
system of monitoring of the conflict zone.
9. Education for the new generation, as well as the 
efforts to reconsolidate the human capital.
10. Moving up the value chain, from raw material 
to added value products, and high value 
manufacturing, especially to tie in to more 
advanced markets in the EU.
